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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEANNA FOXLEY : 
A P P E A L 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : Case No. 890493-CA 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY : Appeal from the Third 
Judicial District Court 
Defendant/Appellant 
Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
STATEMENT OF COURT OF APPEAL JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 5, Utah State Constitution, Section 78-2a-
3(2h) Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal by defendant (husband) from a 
modification of decree of divorce which awarded plaintiff (wife) 
an increase in child support, an increase in alimony and attorneys 
fees. 
The action was brought pursuant to Section 30-3-5 UCA 
(1953) . 
The matter was heard before Honorable Richard Moffat, 
Judge of the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
1 
Trial of the matter came on for hearing on September 22, 
1988, Trial Transcript #1 (TRl) and was continued to March 7, 1989, 
Trial Transcript #2 (TR2). Thereafter defendant filed an objection 
to findings and several motions which were heard on June 1, 1989, 
Trial Transcript #3 (TR3); defendant filed a motion to stay 
execution of judgment which was heard on October 27, 1989, Trial 
Transcript #4 (TR4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. DID THE COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY OF CONDUCT OF 
THE PARTIES PRIOR TO THE DIVORCE AND WAS IT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR TO INCLUDE SUCH EVIDENCE IN 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS. 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY ORDERING ALIMONY INCREASED FROM $10.00 TO 
$1,350.00 PER MONTH. 
III. WERE THE TRIAL COURT'S AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL. 
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF AN INCREASE OF $1,547.00 
PER MONTH CHILD SUPPORT. 
V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND 
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR J.N.O.V. 
VI. DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES. 
VII. DID THE COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL. 
VIII. SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE HAVE BEEN 
DISQUALIFIED TO HEAR THIS MATTER. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by defendant (husband) from an order 
of modification awarding plaintiff (wife) an increase of child 
support from $150.00 per month per child to $546.00 per month per 
child; an increase in alimony from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per month; 
ordering defendant to provide health and dental insurance; and, 
awarding plaintiff the sum of $4,394.00 in attorneys fees. 
Defendant is asking the Court to reverse the court's 
order in its entirety and to award him attorneys fees and costs of 
his appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 8, 1976, the parties above-named were married 
(TR2 16). During the course of the marriage three (3) children 
were born to the parties (TRl 25:14) and defendant adopted a 
daughter from Plaintiff's prior marriage (TRl 28:13-17). The 
parties separated in April, 1982, after five and one-half (5 1/2) 
years of marriage (TRl 44:1) and were divorced on June 30, 1983 
(TRl 44:1). The defendant graduated from medical school in June, 
1983, (TR2 49:16). The terms of the divorce decree were stipulated 
to by counsel and the decree itself was drafted by plaintiff's 
attorney (See Exhibit "A"). The decree of divorce originally 
contained the following paragraph pertaining to alimony: 
"4. That the plaintiff is awarded an interest 
in the defendant's medical degree, and is 
awarded the sum of $10.00 per month as alimony, 
and that at such time as the defendant's income 
will support paying a greater amount of 
alimony, the plaintiff shall be entitled to 
seek a greater amount of alimony from the 
court." (See attached Exhibit "A".) 
3 
The decree of divorce was amended to read as follows; 
"4. That the plaintiff has an interest in the 
defendant's medical degree, and is awarded the 
sum of $10.00 per month alimony, and that at 
such time as there has been a material change 
in circumstances of the parties the issues of 
child support and/or alimony may be reviewed." 
(Changes have been emphasized.) 
Plaintiff has been a student from 1983 until the time of 
trial (TR2 57:16-17). 
In June, 1984 plaintiff earned her Bachelors degree in 
sociology (TR2 56:23-25) and anticipates earning her Masters degree 
in June, 1989 (TR2 57:3). 
She intends on earning her Doctorate degree which she 
estimates will take five to ten more years (TR1 31:6-8). 
During 1986 and 1987, plaintiff earned $12,000.00 per 
year from two part-time jobs. (TR1 63:8-12) 
In 1988 one of plaintiff's part-time jobs ended and she 
voluntarily did not increase her hours at her other part-time job. 
(TR1 64) 
Plaintiff estimated her income with child support at 
$2,200.00 per month at the time of trial. (TR2 70:7-9) 
Plaintiff testified that her monthly expenses ranged 
from $1,350.00 (copy of checks from discovery) to $1,800.00 
(estimates) per month. (TR1 53:9-10 and 16-18; TR1 58:19-22; and 
TR1 60:4-10) 
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Plaintiff itemized her expenses as follows: 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
TRl 
37: 
37; 
37: 
37: 
38: 
38: 
39: 
39: 
39: 
40: 
40: 
40 
:l-2 
: 14 
:17 
:19 
:17 
:20 
:5 
:9 
:14-15 
:3 
:19 
:19 
Food $ 225. 
Utilities 
Telephone 
Clothing 
Car expenses 
Car payment 
Dr. bills 
Dental 
Insurance 
House payment 
Tutor 
Miscellaneous 
170, 
40. 
50, 
150. 
165, 
50. 
30, 
90, 
467 
25, 
400 
,00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
per 
per 
per 
per 
per 
per 
per 
per 
per 
per 
per 
per 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
$1,862.00 
Plaintiff testified that her lifestyle had not changed 
during the interim period between the divorce and this hearing. 
(TRl 67:15-17) 
The plaintiff testified at a deposition that she did not 
want alimony as such (TRl 67:18-20) and she testified that she 
wanted restitution because she had earned alimony during the 
marriage. (TR2 55:13-25 and 56:1-2) 
Plaintiff testified that she would use alimony to buy a 
new home (TRl 68:8-10), clothes (TRl 68:13), and furniture and for 
retirement (TRl 68,69). 
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She testified the current home that she had was in 
substantial disrepair (TRl 32), but that she had never tried to 
sell the home (TRl 52, 53). 
Defendant testified that his income in 1982 was $50.00 
per month. (TR2 34:1) 
Defendant received his medical degree in June 1983 . At 
the time of graduation he had been separated from the plaintiff for 
fifteen (15) months (TR2 90:16-18). 
After his internship, defendant moved to Winslow, 
Arizona, where he had practiced his specialty of obstetrics and 
gynecology for the last twenty (20) months (TR2 14:9-13). 
In 1987 defendant had a gross income of $112,358.00. 
(TR2 38:1-3) without deductions for business expenses. 
Since 1987 liability insurance has gone up 50 percent 
for gynecologists and obstetricians (TR2 96:7-11). When defendant 
first opened his practice, insurance was $12,000.00 per year. 
Current estimates are that insurance will be $75,000.00 per year 
(TR2 96:12-17). 
Defendant testified that his current gross income was 
between $5,000.00 and $5,500.00 per month (TR2 97:11-14). 
Defendant testified that he carried health insurance on 
his children at a cost of $335.00 per month (TR2 101:20-22). 
Defendant introduced a child support worksheet with the 
following foundation (TR2 102): 
Gross income was $5,208.33, calculated on 
gross business income of $340,000 minus 
business expenses of approximately $277,500.00. 
(TR2 98:11-13, 102:11-14) 
Based on the foregoing foundation, child support should 
be set at $1,044.00 per month assuming the court granted 
plaintiff's petition for modification (TR2 1-3). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S 
TESTIMONY OF CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES PRIOR TO 
THE DIVORCE. 
Two diverse positions were argued by the parties during 
the trial. 
Plaintiff took the position that because she was awarded 
an interest in defendant's medical degree that she was entitled to 
some award based on the recent case of Martinez v. Martinez, 80 
Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1988), in the form of equitable 
restitution or some other novel remedy. 
Defendant argued that the initial decree of divorce did 
not award plaintiff equitable restitution, therefore plaintiff 
could not modify the decree on that basis by rearguing facts that 
occurred prior to the divorce. The relief in the decree was Res 
Judicata. 
Defendant further asserted that because the Utah Court 
of Appeals had held that a medical degree is not marital property 
[Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P2d 237, 239-42 (Utah App. 1987) and 
Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P2d 238, 240 (Utah App. 1987)] that 
plaintiff's remedy was to show substantial change of circumstances 
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justifying a modification as contemplated by the decree of divorce 
as amended by interlineation. 
The trial court judge ruled that the decree of divorce, 
as amended in 1983 awarding plaintiff an interest in the 
defendant's medical degree, would be held void pursuant to Martinez 
(Supra). 
The court said the case would be reviewed on traditional 
grounds of substantial charges of circumstances warranting an 
increase of alimony and child support, and included the same 
declaration in its minute entry and decision. (See Exhibit "B".) 
"The Court does not find it necessary to invoke 
the recently declared novel theory of 
"equitable restitution" as enunciated by the 
Utah Court of Appeals nor is it necessary to 
invoke the provisions of the divorce decree 
wherein Judge Condor awarded an interest in 
the defendant's medical degree to the 
plaintiff. The Court finds that the change of 
circumstances above set forth are sufficient 
to justify the award herein without further 
findings regarding the questions relating to 
the defendant's medical degree." (Our court's 
minute entry.) 
Defendant would argue that because the court had so ruled 
that it was error to allow testimony by the plaintiff over 
objection of defendant (TR1 20:1-10) of events that occurred prior 
to the divorce and for the court to include such evidence in its 
factual findings, specifically paragraph 7, which states: 
"7. During the marriage, the plaintiff could 
not pursue her formal education due to frequent 
relocations of the defendant in pursuing his 
medical career, because plaintiff was employed 
at various times during the marriage to assist 
in the support of the family, and due to the 
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fact that plaintiff was pregnant for a major 
portion of the time." 
The trial court judge denied defendant's motion to strike 
findings #7 (TR3-18:6-8). 
Defendant's argument is that the trial court abused its 
discretion by in reality awarding plaintiff a form of equitable 
restitution without supporting evidence and while calling it a 
change of circumstances. 
It was prejudicial error to let pre-divorce testimony in 
and to include it in the court's findings of fact #7 (TR3 18:6-8). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
ORDERING ALIMONY INCREASED FROM $10.00 TO 
$1,350.00 PER MONTH. 
A, The evidence did not support the findings of an increase 
in alimony to $1,350.00 per month. 
1. The findings of fact were not adequate to support 
the alimony awarded by the court. 
To avoid a challenge in awarding alimony a court must 
consider three factors. 
— The financial condition and needs of the 
spouse claiming support 
— Ability of that spouse to provide a 
sufficient income for herself 
— Ability of the responding spouse to pay 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
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In Jones (Supra) the court held that the trial court 
"...must exercise its discretion in accordance with the standards 
that have been set by the court." 
If the court does not analyze the circumstances in light 
of the three factors listed above, then under Jones (Supra) the 
court has "...abused its discretion in fixing the alimony award." 
The findings in the case at bar do not contain anything 
that would allow the court to reasonably determine an amount to 
award plaintiff an increase in alimony nor was any evidence 
offered. 
Further, there was no evidence of what would be a 
sufficient income for plaintiff and her ability to provide the 
same. 
The defendant brought the same objection numerous times 
in post judgment motions, indicating to the court that findings 
should reflect the standard enumerated in Jones (Supra) (TR3 
34:16-19) 
Defendant argued that there was no evidence, findings or 
basis as to how the court came up with the amount of alimony (TR3 
41:1-23). Defendant requested the court numerous times to 
enumerate the basis. 
Counsel for plaintiff responded by suggesting that it 
was sufficient to request that amount in plaintiff's petition for 
modification (TR3 42:1-22) and indicated it was impossible to come 
up with an amount. 
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"...you know, that was simply impossible for 
us to do. If they wanted that, they could have 
done it, but it was impossible for us to do. 
If they wanted that, they could have done it, 
but it was impossible for us to do. We were 
extremely limited on the basis and comes into 
this Court and asks for certain things. And 
then to have to pay for them, just in the hope 
that we get in when that money can be much 
better used in the support of the children and 
for the necessities of the children and my 
client—for my client, the plaintiff." 
The trial court's position was that it was the duty of 
the prevailing party to draft adequate findings because that party 
was ultimately the one that would have to sustain it on appeal so 
he would let the findings stand. (TR3 20:5-6) 
"Failure of the trial court to make findings 
on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroversial and capable of supporting only 
awarding in favor of the Judgment." 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P2d 996 (Utah 1987) 
Kinnella v. Baugh, 660 P2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) 
Because even the plaintiff admits it was impossible to 
establish a value for alimony and because the record reflects no 
evidence that would supply an amount, the award of alimony should 
be reversed. 
2. There was no evidence nor finding as to what was a 
sufficient income for plaintiff. 
Neither the court's findings nor did the evidence 
presented, contain anything that would enable the court to 
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establish an income amount that would provide plaintiff sufficient 
income for her needs. 
When asked the direct question as to why she wanted 
alimony, plaintiff responded she did not want alimony: 
"Q. Do you recall being asked the question why 
you want alimony, and you responded that you 
donft want alimony? 
A. Yes. I remember that.11 
(TR1 67:18-20) 
Plaintiff felt that the relief she was requesting was a 
financial award based on pre-divorce testimony. 
The trial court was also perplexed over the amount the 
plaintiff needed. 
"THE COURT: Yeah, I agree. I haven't heard 
from anybody, a dollar figure that she thinks 
she ought to get per month on either alimony 
or child support. We've heard testimony of 
need and testimony of the fact that the doctor 
has [sic] now voluntarily paying a thousand 
dollars per month. But I haven't heard, I 
admit, any figure on what she really thinks she 
ought to have in either figure...But what I 
think we have to look at, is what his current 
need is, what is his current ability to pay and 
giving some effect to the decree as interpreted 
by Martinez to come up with some kind of a 
monthly figure and how I am going to do that 
I am not sure. But I think that's where we're 
headed. 
(TR1 48:9-15 and 49:6-11) 
When asked what she needed alimony for, the plaintiff 
made the following response: 
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,fMR , ERICKSEN: What wou.d you use alimony 
f i»i" , J f you got it? 
A. A I would invent pa-* :r *^e money 
into a new home; I been wanting to do that for 
a long time. Certainly, probably some personal 
needs that I have, 
Q Like wl lat .? 
A. Oh, I am in need of some personal 
things, like a new winter coat and clothes and 
I would like to have some of my furniture 
redone. And the furniture that 1 had when I 
moved and married Bill was all brand new. He 
ruined two of my wooden tables completely. He 
proceeded to sleep on my couch almost every 
day; that it's totally ruined and the wear and 
tear of years and years of using, I think I 
deserve a little better standard of living, 
I really do 
Q. . :•(..! " w »."!rl f.. * . l,t- rost you 9 
— v. p e :'i b- - v •: .id.: : 
priced \ t i ' "I m c w the ccucr.es I looked at 
run $!**:-" " ' - • * - % a 
he nejv thes t:*c 
want 
... 'aat I asked the same 
question t: ;r x i: tr.e deposition taken on 
March 7 4 , , 9-o"' 
* remember that 
Q . Ma /;.• 1 *. .„ - Will r e i r H s 11 y o u.!" 
recollect JO:; '):, line 17 page 85. 
A , n . 
;. ">'iu were asked what you would •!• 
* w ^our alimony would be spent. 
A Ul i huh. 
Q ::fou recal 1 that your answer was, that 
you wou Id put: it into a retirement fund? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall, that you indicated 
you would buy a new car? 
A. I probably said that." 
(TR1 68:6-25 through 69:1-15) 
In no instance in this case was a value placed on the 
needs of the plaintiff to enable the trial judge to come up with 
an amount. 
Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P2d 123 (Utah App. 1987) indicates 
that there must be some clear rational for the level of alimony 
consistent with stated criteria (at 126). 
In this case there was no evidence of a dollar amount or 
range as to what was a sufficient income for plaintiff so that the 
court could evaluate her present income, plus prospective income, 
plus child support, plus alimony. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 29; 
196 P2d 977 (1956). 
There is nothing in the court's findings nor was any 
evidence given as to whether plaintiff was short in meeting her 
monthly obligations and whether those monthly obligations reflected 
a standard of living that was equitable for the plaintiff six (6) 
years after the decree of divorce was entered. 
Defendant acknowledges that plaintiff testified that she 
was behind on her mortgage and property taxes on her home. But, 
nowhere is that delinquency attributed to a shortfall in income. 
14 
D e f e n d a n t wc -;1 J arc-e tv^ * r " rv: ; ,4 • : 
p l a i n t :-rf n e e d s * ^ - . .*r,,M 1 .-^ i ^ d n d a r r i 
f . ; ; - ' - ufJ "i ' . vr . i T1::. * w ~* J S " u r e c ^ c a ' e 
award r 1 a \ i:non*: 
Alimony snouia nci r - -:-
reward for fhp wifp English v. English, * - ^ " -ko 4^  .< • >;tan 1^ 
I .^-- > rlf-c1 t.nat what p sir.r *, M w-- ^*«-or v.v-. 
alimony in r , . 
future physician. 
pi r-ii n* ix t ' s d e p o s i t i o n + **a* w^ fak"e: • M a r o n 
1 Qo - - * ' - • r .. ;•. ; ; ^  *.. . n • 
"Q . A1 1.d 11 1 a t: " s t: 1 1 e basis for wanting 
alimony? 
Ai-. i f you could go back I think 
one quest a o.*: or tw-.-., what you asked me I 
understood i 1 t. n*- in the context of, you 
know, am I after alimony strictly because I 
want a better livelihood. And that is no, the 
answer to that is no I feel that I 
contributed, and as such it's like getting a 
return on my investment essentially." 
(Deanna Foxiey deposition, page 58, lines 18-
"Q. ...The question is, why do you want 
alimony and so far— 
A. I think I explained that to you as 
to sacrifices and other things that ~ upn : •-.-.-
to help him get through. 
Q. - 1 )ast? 
A . r ; rig ' m a r r i a g e 
r
 » / - r i n g y o u r m a r r i a g e , JLII t n e i a : - r 
f i v e y e a r s a.- • ~ 
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A. Isn't that what this is relevant to? 
Q. Well, I'm asking you, is that what 
you are claiming alimony, based on what you 
did five years ago? 
A. I believe it's based on the fact that 
I earned alimony or, as I said earlier, some 
sort of restitution." 
(TR2 55:13-25 through 56:1-2) 
The award of $1,350.00 per month alimony should be 
reversed. 
3. There was no finding nor evidence that the plaintiff 
did not have the ability to provide a sufficient income for 
herself. 
Without a finding and evidence as to what was sufficient 
income to support a standard of living, it would be impossible to 
determine if plaintiff had the ability to provide the necessary 
income to meet the standard. 
The evidence at trial was that plaintiff was voluntarily 
keeping her income low when she had both the opportunity and 
ability to earn more. 
Plaintiff testified that she had received her Bachelors 
degree in sociology in 1984 (TR1 29:1-10), would receive her 
Masters degree in sociology in May 1989 (TR1 30:17-18). 
The plaintiff testified that she had two part-time jobs 
and that in 1986 and 1987 she earned approximately $12,000.00 per 
year (TR1 63:8-12). 
16 
Just prior to trial she testified that she was laid off 
from _ "le of tne p^r'-t . n- -.-..>- """' : f 4 j, and voluntarily refused 
to 1. 
"Q. Isn't it true m a t you could just 
by merely applying to the Veteran's 
Administration, get more hoi: :-s? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you haver - ;i.ec :de. to do that? 
A. I have not," 
"Q. Do you rememher testifying you could 
have gone to the V.A. and got a better job? 
A. All I said was tha; ±i I applied for 
a full-time clerk/typist job, I could probably 
get 40-hour-a-week clerk/typist lor Ru I 
don't want that kind of v: . 
Ericksen." 
l.:u o5*18-23) 
-:.-.,:.. »-;< .-lt . -* +-o p?,rn 
a minimum <*T between $ . •• ,'0: K '• < an i $ 00 CM nei ^ a *.. a 
Masters degree (TR2 64 2 0-23). 
Defendan 1 "s ex peri. • • ' .mare-;: income f^r s p^r^rr^ •---*-^  -* 
Bachelors aegree ^aiar; range .oerwee* $ GCK * to 
$19, Of. .-.00 per- vp^r 7* • p .4; and $iy,uui i 
a Mas • . :-^  
Despite tfiis •. ref-re^ testim-.ny t;=e --lur* c-(-'* ^".iinony 
a s perpetual without a • .; 
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abilities which was a clear abuse of the court's discretion and 
reversible error. 
B. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding 
plaintiff equitable restitution. 
What the trial court in reality did when it modified 
alimony from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per month without a termination 
date was to award plaintiff a form of equitable restitution but 
couch it in substantial change of circumstances language. 
Such an approach was an absolute abuse of discretion for 
the following reasons: 
1. The marriage was of short duration 
approximately 5 1/2 years. 
2. The divorce was a stipulated default 
hearing. There was no indication in 
the record as to whether the court 
considered reasons why plaintiff was 
entitled to an interest in 
defendant's medical degree. 
3. The language awarding alimony and an 
interest in defendant's medical 
degree was vague and ambiguous at 
best. Language was interlined and 
replaced with language that required 
a substantial change of 
circumstances. (See Exhibit "A" 
attached.) 
6. The trial court was without 
discretion to retry the divorce on 
the alimony issue and should have 
reviewed the alimony award on 
traditional substantial change of 
circumstances grounds. Instead, it 
is clear that the court felt that 
value should be placed on the 
defendant's degree and fashioned an 
amount without any supporting 
evidence or findings. 
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The defendant objected to this approach ":. - hearing on 
June ; ;.-•<•• -,[\c aske;; th** « * -ir + pursue* * " i Rasband v. Rasband, 
7r- • * " " --' • . ::ess that the coi irt 
usee T. i aetermiiih ti.t ...timate <-1 MTK ; .;: -.: . 
I* i^ c ;eav from : •< * rarf-.c ' n;. ; • r.<- amended fi'::^h "TK 
- . .•:. ;- -M -- : "ne rationa. -;>ec 
was i lot the same as the court wrote in its memorandum decision nor 
included + u
 A;s amended findin :;•--. , 
M
 .Seems to me, what we have to look at when 
you come to the standard we have always had of 
change of circumstances, with ability to pay 
and need, and then the concept of she helped 
provide the degree, she ought to get something 
out if during a time of need. And you see, 1 
am qualifying that during the time of need 
think that what we've got to look: at: 
here ;s more and I am aware that—well aware 
of the fact the defendant's [sic] view of this 
is different than mine. But what I think we 
have to look at, is what his current need is, 
what is his current ability to pay and giving 
some effect to the decree as interpreted by 
Martinez to come up with some kind of a monthly 
figure and how I am going to do that, I am not 
si ire. But 1 think that's where we're headed." 
(TR1 48 : 2 3-2 S and 4'"-* ! I I I 
"THE COURT • We * . • •. seems tu me that :i t 
the court makes the decision, that under the 
Martinez case, that Paragraph 4 is void. Maybe 
I can't make that decision. Maybe I have made 
it but maybe I can't make it because maybe I 
have to say that should go up on appeal to be 
changed. But if that's the case, it seems to 
me that yoi i are caught on the horns of a 
dilemma. I'm either going to leave it in 
effect and you can appeal it, and get it 
changed, or I'm going to hold that the Martinez 
case says that, as it holds, that you can't 
award an interest in the medical degree bi; it 
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that the equitable restitution has to be 
subject to it. For if it isn't going to take 
something away and then not furnish the 
substitute that has been provided in the case, 
you can't have a half of the Martinez case. 
You either get it or you don't. 
And so if you're going to say that this 
was improper under Martinez you're going to 
have to accept the result of Martinez as far 
as equitable restitution is concerned. If 
you're going to take the position that you 
don't want Martinez' equitable restitution, 
then I'm going to say we're not going to set 
this aside. You can't have both." 
(TR2 25:13-25 and 26:1-8) 
"THE COURT: I don't care whether it was 
appealed or not. You've got it back before me 
and I can just simply say okay, we'll leave it 
as it is, and if somebody else wants to appeal, 
now you can go ahead and do it. I don't know. 
But if that's the case, she has an interest in 
his degree as set forth in this agreement or 
in this decree; and that being the case, I'll 
simply make a determination as to how much of 
his income he'll pay to her each month. I 
mean, you just can't catch me in that. I'm not 
going to take away one hand and take away with 
the other hand because Martinez doesn't say 
that and neither does this decision. You can't 
have both sides with no benefit or with no 
burden on the other side. 
(TR2 26:14-25 and 27:1) 
"...Now, I don't think I need to make any 
determination as to what interest she has in 
that degree. I think all we have to do is, she 
had an interest and I'll make an award of 
alimony. Now, the question as to later on, 
having done that, the question is with alimony 
being tied to an interest in a degree, one is 
something the court created and the other is 
something he earned. 
With the decree having created an interest 
in his degree in the plaintiff, the question 
then becomes, and I'm not going to answer it 
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today, as to whether or not that goes on ad 
infinitum or whether i 1 ' n terminable in the 
future." 
ana 
"THE COURT: But I think, taking Mr. 
Ericksen's view, that there was no pleading 
and no claim of equ I table restitution, but 
simply a seeking of an interest in the degree 
and the court awarded it; that hasn't been 
changed as of this point, Thei 1 we'll proceed 
under that provision and we'll set alimony here 
today. I'm not going to put a termination date 
on i t. I wouldn't anyway. 
And thei :i as time proceeds, we'll see 
whether or not somebody wants to go up and let 
the appellate court change that decision or 
whether or not with the passage of time, the 
parties can resolve it themselves. If not, it 
will go on, 
MR. HUGHES: My one thought, 1 agree wjth 
everything, of course, the court says. But in 
this case, equitable restitution is just 
another term or subcategory, and I read it, for 
the term alimony and allows the court to be 
very creative, 
THE COURT: : aoree. 
"MR .
 E R I C K S E N . # # # T h e court's minute 
entry indicated that the co art would not find 
equitable restitution, because the di vorce has 
been tried and the facts leading up to the 
divorce had been tried and heard by Judge 
Conder. And I think it's inappropriate to put 
in findings that in essence, this court retried 
the divorce, especially in light of the fact 
that the court held in the minute entry that 
it would not consider the doctrine* of equitable 
restitution 
THE COURT: Let me tell you where I came 
down on that one and you can tell me whether 
you agree CJ I:-- t . M, T find it necessary 
to invoke * - * "•.? % ec;_. ; M C *-" restitution 
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because I felt that the change of circumstances 
alone were sufficient; so to the extent that 
equitable restitution is spelled out in any one 
of those paragraphs, it really wouldn't have 
any bearing on it; however, I did feel that a 
substantial portion of my decision was based 
upon the background of this marriage and the 
relative privation that the parties went 
through; but in particular, the plaintiff. And 
I!ll be perfectly honest with you, the 
continuing privation that she has. She and the 
children have suffered since the time that the 
defendant has divorced and established his 
medical practice. That, frankly, was a 
substantial, moving motivation, the level of 
which and one of the reasons for which I set 
the figures where I did. 
Now, I don't know that these facts are 
anything other than just facts which have 
background value partly upon which the thing 
I have just explained is based, my decision. 
MR. ERICKSEN: I guess it would be my 
argument that if the court is going to go back 
prior to the divorce and take from that period 
of time the facts and that method or, you know, 
thought process, it should be included in the 
findings of fact. 
And when I saw this, I guess the question 
that I had was, I see the minute entry that 
equitable restitution was not going to be 
considered. And when you look at equitable 
restitution, really, that's an issue that she 
should be restored as to what she has expended 
in some form or other. 
THE COURT: Or that she ought to share in 
that which her labors produced. 
MR. ERICKSEN: Right. And so when you 
said that you weren't going to go that route, 
but then you went and we have got facts that 
go back prior to the divorce; it looks like in 
fact that that's what it's aimed at. 
Now, if it's a different animal, if it's 
not the standard and the court in its minute 
entry says basically that we're going to go 
along with— 
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THE COURT: Change of circumstances. 
MR. ERICKSEN; - -change of circumstances, 
the standard type of situation and yet, it 
doesn't follow the guidelines in the current 
Supreme Court cases as to what you consider 
when you arc? looking at modi : ications. You 
look from the decree forward. You look at the 
standard of living at the time of the decree 
a n d you 1 o o k a t t h e f i n. a n c i a I n e e d , a n d look 
at the ability to pay at the time of the need 
and look at how those have changed since the 
time of the decree. 
THE COURTi That's basically r ight. 
Right, I agree with that, Mr. Ericksen. The 
only value here is for a historical background 
as to the financial 1 affairs of the parties, ..." 
(TR3 ] 0 i 2 -2 5 11 1 2 5 12 i 1-14) 
"THE COURT: The thing that • 1 think 
happened here, Mr. Ericksen, and maybe we ought 
to straighten this up a little bit is, that in 
e f f e ct, without t h I s decre e e v e r hav i ng been 
the subject of an appellate decision; the 
decision of Judge Conder in awarding an 
interest ii I the doctor's medica1 degree to his 
wife at the time of the divorce in which it's 
clear to me, it was clear to me that Judge 
Conder was looking and saying, there is nothing 
in this marriage at this time and I can't take 
care of the wife and children the way that they 
ought to be taken care of because there isn't 
enough income yet. But he has a degree that's 
going to make him money. So, I'm going to 
award, and she helped him get that degree; 
therefore, I'm going to award her an interest 
in the degree. That's what he said in his 
decision. But then since that time, that basis 
of a wifely interest or a spouse's interest in 
the other's degree has been in effect overruled 
by our appellate court. 
And so I found that that being the case, 
you're sort of back to ground one on what she's 
e n t i 11 e d t o a t t h i s t i m e . ' * 
(TR3 13:22-25, 14:1-16) 
2 3 
"MR. ERICKSEN: ...where Ifm coming from 
and is kind of a two-pronged approach. Number 
one, we didn!t know why Judge Conder did what 
he did, there wasn't sufficient findings to 
present that. Could have been a couple of 
attorneys that just basically, as part of the 
packaging, that just put it in. 
Second of all, there is no evidence 
introduced in court as to why it was put in or 
what it even meant. , 
Third of all, the court in its minute 
entry basically said I am looking at the change 
of circumstances since the date of the divorce 
on the first page. And the court finds that 
a substantial change of circumstances had 
occurred in that the defendants income has 
increased since the date of the divorce from 
virtually nothing. 
Then the court, using language like that 
through its minute entry, was only looking at 
the date of the decree forward. Then we have 
findings that are replete with information that 
goes back prior to the divorce and why certain 
things were done, and the fact that she had 
hardships and things prior to the divorce. 
If the court is in fact basing its 
decision on things that happened prior to the 
divorce. 
THE COURT: It really wasn't, except to 
the extent that I thought it necessary to make 
it clear that I was not following Judge 
Conder's award of an interest in the degree 
because I don't think under today's law that's 
a valid decision. 
MR. ERICKSEN: Well, the court was 
compensating in another way other than the 
standard tradition. 
THE COURT: No, I wasnf t I was going 
strictly at the time of the divorce, not the 
current time...." 
(TR3 14:19-25, 15:1-24) 
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"THE COURT: Ifve got a problem in that 
in adjusting for the lack of an interest in 
that degree, we still should show, because you 
see, you take away something Judge Conder gave 
her and I understand you say maybe the lawyers 
did it; but the point of it is, once the Judge 
has signed it, those are his findings, so you 
have to say the Judge did it. I can only find 
one real reason for that, whether or not it 
was borne out in the minds of the lawyers, or 
whether it was the judge's decision; once he 
signed it, it becomes his and that is, it was 
intended that she have a right in the future 
to come back and receive some of the benefits 
from the earnings from that degree. I mean, 
no o the r way t o i n t e rpre t the f i nd i ngs t ha t 
she has a cont inu 11 1 g interest :i n that degree . 
N o w i f y o 11 s a y , o r i f a 1 a w s a y s , w e J 1 , 
you can't do that, and I don't think equitable 
restitution frankly was the answer, even though 
our Court of Appeals has a real doozy of a 
theory on that. But I do think that you can't 
take it away with one hand and not give it back 
with the other. You see what I'm saying? 
So, yen i can't say she can't have her 
interest in the degree without saying that 
nevertheless it's perfectly obvious if you take 
it away from her and don't make any adjustment 
at the time of the original divorce, some 
adjustment should be made at: til lis time. I 
guess that 's basicaJ ly what 1 ''in. sa^ ii lg . 
You're saying you shouldn't go back beyond 
1:1 ie date of the divorce , 
MR. ERICKSEN: Not only that, but I b;;:'t 
think we ever came to court and said you 
shouldn't take it away. We came to court 
saying there is no evidence. The plaintiff in 
this case offered no evidence as to what the 
percentage of the degree was, what it was worth 
o r a n y t h i n g e 1 s e ; t h e r e f o r e , ,:i t: f a i 1 s . 
THE COURT: Wei1, t here wasn't anything 
within the decree itself tl lat sai ci, either. 
It was very open-ended and I guess that's one 
of the reasons that the evidence was put in 
about the events that led up to the divorce. 
And that is, the living conditions and her 
contributions at that time was to try and 
educate me, so that factor tells you what I'm 
going to do, though." 
(TR3 16:15-25, 17:1-25, 18: 
"MR. ERICKSEN: Not only wasn't there any 
length, there wasn't any argument as to the 
amount. 
THE COURT: Yeah, but you see, what I have 
done in effect is, I converted that interest 
that Judge Conder awarded, which now has been 
held not to be proper from an interest in a 
degree to an award of alimony. And you are 
probably right. It probably shouldn't go on 
forever, although at the time that Judge Conder 
awarded that decree, awarded alimony or the 
right to alimony in this case, they were 
awarding alimony forever. So, I guess the 
modification should have been to terminate 
alimony at a given point." 
(TR3 28:3 
"THE COURT: Well, my point is this: If 
we say the rights of these parties were fixed 
by the '83 decree and Judge Conder says I'm 
going to give her $10 a month or a hundred 
dollars--" 
(TR3 28:15 
"THE COURT: —per month alimony because 
you can't afford any more right now; under a 
change of circumstances she can come back and 
we'll talk about alimony and child support. 
So, you come back and we talk about it and I 
say, well, the award was an interest in the 
degree--got degree and decree here—is 
improper. But nevertheless, there has been a 
substantial change of circumstances, so I'm 
going to order some alimony. Then I award her 
alimony, which is nothing other than an 
expansion of the rights that Judge Conder 
granted her to start with. But I expanded it 
to the extent I did, because it was to take 
care of the fact that the appellate court, 
without ever knowing about this particular 
case, took away her interest in that degree by 
a decision in another case. 
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S : , I have upped it and I've not said 
anything about terminating because nobody 
argued to me about whether it should be 
terminated, Now, I suppose thaf -~ ~ legitimate 
question to be considered a4 r^:n,^  p°-* " ^n 
time. 
(TR3 28:20- 25, 29: 1 12) 
"THE COURT: Both sides of this thing, 
you're sort of getting hoist on your own 
petard. To determine, Mr. Ericksen, when, if 
ever, alimony should be reduced or terminated 
in this case, I think you're right. You're 
going to have to go back and look at the whole 
situation. It seems to me you can't determine 
that alone and wouldn't be to your client's 
best interest to do it, I don't think, to 
determine it alone solely from the date of the 
divorce on. I think to be equitable about it, 
you're going to have to go back and look at the 
whole factual situation surrounding this 
marriage in order to make a time definition of 
what in effect is an award of alimony to take 
care of the interest that the plaintiff has or 
had in the earning abi lity she helped provide 
for the defendant. 
I suppose, because we tried the case 
almost from scratch, I mean, all of the 
background and history came in and everything, 
I suppose I could make some ki nd of a 
determination on that today...." 
(TR3 29:23-25, 30:1- 15) 
"MR. ERICKSEN: I think we should, and 
the other question is, that still isn't clear, 
is the court saying that Judge Conder awarded 
alimony in the form of the degree and pegged 
that value of that at $10 or is this a separate 
animal? Do we have the degree on one hand and 
$10 alimony on i the other hand, mutually 
independent? 
THE COURT: I think what he is saying is 
there isn't enough money to pay alimony, so 
gee, I'm going to award $10, and obviously the 
marriage that existed for rs^r w;> '"• * • .:nder 
the circumstance.- tr.a* e>:i^ ie-i VJ . t \ Tnat 
marriage at that date could have been paid, and 
if alimony could have been paid, it was 
completely inadequate as an award. And he 
thought he was giving her a right because he 
spelled it out in the decree—a right to come 
back for additional alimony, and child support, 
and an interest in that medical degree. 
And what I would think he was saying, I 
mean, I don!t know how else to interpret it 
because she has an interest in that when he 
starts earning more money; she's entitled to 
something, and she's entitled to be supported 
better and so are those children. And what I 
have said, well, why if it's the issue of 
whether or not she has an interest in it or 
whether or not she doesn't under current law, 
let's award an adequate alimony figure based 
upon what I found to be adequate money to pay 
for it. But I didn't cut it off, and I agree 
with you, I did not, and I'll be further honest 
with you, I really didn't give that a great 
deal of thought because of two factors. One, 
it wasn't argued or suggested, and secondly, 
you sort of have thoughts in the back of your 
head, and I recognize this costs time and 
money, but sometimes you have to do this." 
(TR3 30:23-25, 31:1-25, 32:1 
The court converted the interest in the degree to 
award of alimony because it found that: 
"It was intended that she have a right in 
the future to come back and receive some 
benefits from the earnings from the degree. 
I mean no other way to interpret the findings 
that she has a continuing interest in that 
degree." 
(TR3 16:24-25 and 17: 
This exclamation was in direct contradiction to the f 
that the same? language had been interlined out of the decree 
Judge Conder. (See Exhibit "A" . ) 
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This approach was reversible error and an abuse of the 
c oi :i rt ! s d :i scret ioi : 
C. The aw 
W i t h O b rt j n . K - «;i i\ ctw , -._ „- . v a s 
inequitable and not ii 1 lii le witi i standards well established in 
The purpose of alimoi ly "... is to provide support for 'he 
wife as nearly as p O S S2ble at the standard of livi i ig si fv! ed 
during the marriage, and to prevent, the wife from becomin. - . u L . .1 r. 
charge," English .^ii-ra* 
Plaint if r admit u^ -i !:»;•' * -• ... 
changed, since the divorce,. 
D e f e n d a n t d o e s net diu.u' * . * * :,- E n g l i s h (Surra case 
p :r - . . -. .----J 
tne court m a / a> teri e q u a l i z e :.ir ^ : ; - * **_{ r *- G a r d n e r v. 
Ga r d n e r , 74-- P; . ;f"- "tar. j'-Jnr>i r- .- ^; :•» - ^ u p p ^ r t a n c s p o u s e ' s 
c.'^  *•-,•*,. • M a r t i n e z ( Sup 1: a,) j 3 "i 1 pI: 1 e I :i b \ t: 1 1 e Sup 1 • e 1 ne Co 1 11 1: 
and Decodes tne law. 
What: i, s i neqi 1, i tab 1 e i s t o make an a,wa rd o f a 1 imony w:i th 
rt, • : b a, s • :i s c • 1 e v „i d e r 1 c e o f v a 11 1 e :> f 1 i 1 1 a t: :i s s u f f i c „:i e r 11 o f w 1: 1 a, t 
plain 11, f f needs. 
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THE TRIAL COURTS AMENDED FINDING:* uu FACT ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL. 
-J 
Attached as Exhibit "C" in the amended findings of fact 
and order, defendant argues that the findings of fact are not 
supported by the evidence, 
"Finding No. 10: The court finds that the plaintiff and the minor 
children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the 
divorce." 
There is nothing in the record that would support this 
finding. 
"Finding No. 12: The plaintiff intends to continue with her 
education in an effort to maximize her income potential. The 
testimony and evidence admitted at trial indicates that the 
prospects of the plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time 
employment in her field will be difficult without additional 
education and that even with additional education, employment 
opportunities are projected to be limited in the future." 
The evidence does not support this finding as there is 
nothing in the record that plaintiff has applied for any jobs nor 
was expert testimony presented as to job availability. 
"Finding No. 16: The earnings of the defendant as well as his 
future potential have been considered by the court for the purpose 
of determining whether the amount of alimony should be modified." 
No evidence was placed into the record respecting 
defendant's future potential earnings. 
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"Finding No. 17: The defendant's present income is not completely 
clear but the court finds based upon the evidence that his gross 
income can be interpreted as being as high as $224,000.00 a year 
but certainly under no circumstances less than approximately 
$120,000.00 per year." 
There is absolutely no basis or evidence whereby the 
court could come up with those figures. 
"Finding No. 19 : The court finds that there has been a substantial 
change of circumstances in the parties income since the time of the 
divorce." 
The court does not specify with precision what the change 
of circumstances are. As such it is reversible error Jones 
(Supra). 
"Finding No. 21 : Based upon the change of circumstances and the 
needs of the children, child support to be paid by the defendant 
should be increased to the appropriate amount reflected in the 
judicial district's support guidelines." 
Plaintiff did not put into evidence the requisite 
foundational amounts that would allow anyone to complete a 
worksheet. 
The finding should specify the evidence presented and 
why the child support awarded is the appropriate amount. 
"Finding No. 27: The court finds that at the time of the 
modification hearing, there has been a substantial change in 
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circumstances of the parties, that the plaintiff has a real and 
substantial need for an increase in alimony and that she has 
endured substantial and significant personal hardships since the 
time of the divorce." 
The finding does not indicate that the court analyzed 
the three (3) factors in Jones (Supra) and is therefore fatally 
defective. 
"Finding No. 28: The court finds that it is just and equitable 
that the monthly alimony to be paid by the defendant to the 
plaintiff should be increased from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00 
per month. Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989." 
The finding does not include any basis, method or 
calculation as to how the sum of $1,350.00 was arrived at other 
than it is the figure contained in plaintiff!s amended petition. 
"Finding No. 29 : The court further finds that the defendant should 
be required to provide health and dental insurance for the minor 
children of the parties. The court further finds that it is 
equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including 
orthodontic expenses, not paid by health and dental insurance 
should be divided equally between the parties." 
There was no evidence as to cost, availability or need 
placed in the record. 
"Finding No. 30: The court finds that attorneys fees should be 
awarded to the plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable 
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attorneys fees would be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs 
incurred herein." 
The $4,394.00 figure is based on a supplemental pleading 
filed 10-days after the trial ended. Because it was not properly 
included in the record, nor is there evidence it was even requested 
by the court, this finding is without support in the record of the 
trial. 
"Finding No. 31: The court finds that the plaintifffs counsel's 
fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering 
the length of time expended and the complexities of the issues, 
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable." 
The finding does not include the standard in the 
community nor was there one scintilla of evidence in the record 
that would support this finding. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING PLAINTIFF AN INCREASE OF $1,547.00 
PER MONTH CHILD SUPPORT. 
A. The evidence does not support the finding of $1,547.00 
per month child support. 
The plaintiff in presentation of her case did not present 
any evidence of the amount needed for child support. 
She did not produce a child support worksheet until after 
the trial was through. (TR2 112:15-16) 
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The worksheet was allowed over the objection of the 
defendant. The court's ruling was that the court could accept the 
worksheet at any time. 
Defendants objection was that there was no foundation 
for the figures used to compose the worksheet nor an opportunity 
by defendant to challenge those figures. 
If plaintiff had properly introduced the figures and 
there would have been proper foundation used to compose the 
worksheet then the issue would have been different. Because the 
trial court awarded the plaintiff the support figures contained on 
the plaintiff's worksheet, the same constitutes reversible error. 
B. The findings do not indicate the reason that child 
support was set at $1,638.00 per month. 
In the court's minute entry the court raised child 
support to $1,547.00 per month, yet plaintiff's counsel, who 
drafted findings, raised it to $1,6388.00 without explanation, 
basis or finding. 
C. The child support was inequitable. 
For the same reasons as iterated in defendant's arguments 
for reversal, defendant would argue the same arguments here 
including the fact that no amount was given at the close of 
plaintiff's case. 
In the event the court did find change of circumstances 
to justify an increase in child support, the court should have 
increased child support to a total of $1,044.00 per month based on 
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the only evidence presented by defendant and the worksheet 
introduced by defendant into evidence. 
D. The court ordered defendant to maintain health insurance 
without considering its effect on child support on the ability of 
defendant to pay. 
There was no evidence of any of these elements by 
plaintiff nor any findings supporting the same. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND 
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR J.N.O.V. 
Rule 50(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
11
 (b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed 
verdict made at the close of all the evidence 
is denied or for any reason is not granted, 
the court is deemed to have submitted the 
action to the jury subject to a latter 
determination of the legal questions raised by 
the motion...." 
Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant 
brought the following motion: 
"MR. ERICKSEN: Your Honor, I think we 
would like to bring a motion to dismiss and we 
base this on a couple of things. 
First of all, there's been no evidence 
before the Court of any amount whatsoever; and 
that the Court, as far as the alimony, no 
evidence before the Court at all of any 
evidence of value, or amounts that the 
plaintiff has there and that the plaintiff is 
asking. We've heard testimony of some need, 
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that the house is in disrepair, but been no 
value or basis. 
I've got a copy of a transcript of Mrs. 
Foxley's last court appearance. And I don't 
find anything in there on which a Court can 
base a decision on an amount. The plaintiff 
has not put into evidence any child support 
schedule and the plaintiff has not requested 
or proved any amount; therefore, based on that 
fact, the Court should dismiss the petition. 
The plaintiff, in addition, has not put on any 
evidence of value of the medical degree and 
been no economic expert, been no testimony as 
to an opinion or value; therefore, the Court 
cannot make a decision on value because there 
is no evidence in the record. 
THE COURT: I am afraid Ifve got to 
disagree, Mr. Ericksen. My notes reveal, and 
my memory tells me that the testimony was — 
well, it showed about a $1,371.00 a month 
expense for the family and her testimony was 
that's probably about what she cleared. 
Further, the testimony is, or the procedure 
here is based upon your position that there has 
been no pleading for equitable restitution, and 
therefore, Paragraph 4 should remain in effect. 
If Paragraph 4 remains in effect, then 
clearly, giving it meaning there is a provision 
that there will be a right of review in this 
matter. And under the law, there is anyway. 
But specifically, that the question of alimony 
should be reviewed when there has been a 
material change in circumstances of the 
parties. The testimony is here that there has 
been a change of material circumstances in the 
doctor's income. 
There is also a continuing material change 
with the children being older and their demands 
increasing. That's even more borne out to a 
certain extent and supported even by the 
testimony that came in today regarding, at 
least the evidence regarding the payment on 
the house. 
I think that we need to resolve the matter 
and even assuming your position were correct 
at this point, if I were to take that position 
and dismiss this petition here today, there 
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would not be a thing in the world to prevent 
the plaintiff from turning around and re-filing 
tomorrow and coming right back and go clear 
through this thing clear over again. That 
would be a waste of everyone fs time and effort. 
We ought to try and resolve this issue 
hopefully on a long-term basis so the parties 
can get back to living and quit fighting. 
So I am going to deny the motion at this 
time." 
(TR2 50:1-25, 51:1-25, and 52:1-3) 
Even assuming that the court was correct in regards to 
change of circumstances there was absolutely no evidence of what 
constituted a sufficient amount to meet plaintiff1s needs. 
The court erred in not granting defendants motion. 
VI. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES. 
A. The plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence whatso-
ever that would support an award of attorneys fees, including 
Findings 30 and 31. 
At the end of trial plaintiff made a proffer over the 
objection of the defendant of attorneys fees. (TR2 114:7-25 and 
115:1-9) (See attached Exhibit "D".) 
Plaintiff proffered that attorneys fees were $3,000.00. 
(TR2 115:1-4) 
This amount was admitted over objection of defendant. 
(See Exhibit "E".) 
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Ten days after the trial counsel for defendant received 
a 3-page document, dated March 16, 1989, entitled supplement to 
attorneys fees of Robert Hughes. (See Exhibit !fF!f . ) 
The document was not in affidavit form and instead of a 
$3,000.00 previous balance showed a balance of $3,180.00, 
The amount due on the bottom of the statement attachment 
was $4,394.25. 
This is the figure that the court used in its award of 
attorneys fees. 
B. The court abused its discretion in using the supplement 
submitted 10 days after trial to award attorneys fees. 
The current status of the law in Utah is that an award 
of attorneys fees must be based on evidence showing first that 
there is financial need of the person receiving the award and 
second that the award is reasonable. Porco v. Porco, 752 P2d 365 
(Utah App. 1988) 
In Talley v. Talley, 739 P2d 83 (Utah App. 1987) the 
court reversed an award of attorneys fees when the wife's counsel 
proffered testimony and produced an exhibit itemizing the time 
and costs expended and the hourly rates charged. The court 
reversed the award of attorneys fees because there was no evidence 
regarding the "...necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the 
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of 
the case and the result accomplished, and the rates commonly 
charged for divorce action in the community....11 
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Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980) 
Huck v. Huck, 734 P2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986) 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 769 P2d 820 (Utah App. 1989) 
This case is further off the mark because not only wasn't 
there evidence introduced that caused reversal in Talley (Supra), 
the evidence was not introduced at trial so that defendant had an 
opportunity to cross-examine it. 
As a result, the court should reverse the court's award 
of attorneys fees. 
C. The amended findings of fact do not contain the critical 
element finding that the plaintiff is in financial need. The 
plaintiff did not put on one scintilla of evidence evidencing that 
she was unable to pay her attorneys fees. 
The request for attorneys fees must be accompanied by 
evidence at trial as to the nature and amount of such fees. 
Warren v. Warren, 655 P2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982) 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P2d 1076 (Utah 1988) 
It is reversible error not to make specific findings 
outlining the standard required to be awarded attorneys fees. 
Acton (Supra). 
The court should reverse the award of attorneys fees to 
plaintiff. 
D. Plaintiff has failed to submit an affidavit of costs 
leaving the findings vague and ambiguous. 
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Plaintiff is required by Rule 54(d)(2) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to submit an affidavit of costs within five (5) 
days of judgment if they are to be awarded. 
The supplement includes costs on its face. 
Because plaintiff did not comply with Rule 54(d)(2) the 
entire award should be set aside because it appears that costs and 
attorneys fees are intermixed. 
VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions 
of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all 
or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues, for any of the following causes... 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of 
the...adverse party... 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material 
for the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial... 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against law....11 
A, Plaintiff committed perjury at trial. 
The defendant in a post judgment motion presented the 
court with affidavits by one Robert Farr (Exhibit "G") that 
Plaintiff had committed perjury at trial in at least the following 
particulars: 
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1. Plaintiff in discovery and at trial represented that 
she had one bank account when she in fact had a secret bank account 
that she ran money through. (TR1 59:1-3) 
Defendant alleges that an attorney that plaintiff 
socialized with advised her not to disclose the existence of the 
account. 
2. Plaintiff in discovery and at the time of trial 
asked plaintiff to disclose her assets. Plaintiff failed to 
disclose that she had purchased an airplane having invested 
$4,500.00 in said asset. 
Defendant claimed that this fact was material as 
plaintiff represented that she was in need and that her home was 
in substantial disrepair and that she could not pay her mortgage 
or property taxes. 
3. Plaintiff in discovery and in trial represented that 
her home was in substantial disrepair and that she did not have 
adequate funds to repair the same. After trial she submitted a 
bill to the underlying mortgage holder that she had expended 
$19,000.00 towards improvements on the home. (See Exhibit "H" 
attached.) This is perjury on its face. 
Because of these irregularities by the adverse party the 
Judge should have held plaintiff in contempt of court and ordered 
a new trial or dismissed plaintiff!s petition. 
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B. The affidavit of Farr represents newly discovered 
evidence which was material and not discoverable after reasonable 
diligence. 
Even assuming that defendant did not commit perjury the 
above evidence would constitute new evidence not available at 
trial . 
In Defendant's motion for new trial based on the 
foregoing defendant was asked why he could not have discovered that 
plaintiff had purchased an airplane for $4,500.00. 
Defendant responded by indicating to the court that three 
(3) weeks after the trial defendant's counsel was contacted by a 
person whom plaintiff was suing over the plane. (TR3 157:7-16) 
See Exhibit "I" submitted on defendant's motion for new trial. 
It is interesting to note that the complaint was filed 
but not served until three (3) days after the trial was completed. 
(See Exhibit "J" attached.) 
Plaintiff's response is contained in the transcript and 
her counsel characterizes the airplane situation as "...a more 
thorny issue" (TR3 53:7-8) and argues if there was error in failure 
to disclose it should be harmless error. 
Defendant would emphatically emphasize that one of the 
major issues was the need of the plaintiff. Certainly if the 
plaintiff shelled out $4,500.00 for an airplane, $19,000.00 for 
home improvements, intentional failure to disclose these items is 
not harmless error. 
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The plaintiff committed perjury on the face of the record 
according to her own attorney's representations: 
"...Mr. Ericksen did ask, do you have an 
interest in any business and my client said 
no. And did anybody owe you any money. My 
client put just, I think, Dr. Foxley.11 
(TR3 53:9-12) 
VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISQUALIFIED TO HEAR THIS MATTER. 
The defendant filed a motion to recuse the judge based 
on what was perceived as a bias to grant plaintiff relief without 
supporting evidence. 
Based on a review of the record, it would appear that 
Judge Moffat ignored standards enunciated in determining alimony, 
child support and attorneys fees. 
The defendant's motion should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
I. 
The court committed reversible error by allowing evidence 
of the conduct of the parties prior to the divorce. The court in 
essence retried the divorce substituting its own impressions to 
fill in inadequacies contained in the original decree of divorce. 
The court then found that there was substantial change of 
circumstances that was not supported by the evidence. 
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The original decree should have been considered Res 
Judicata and the court should not have substituted new findings 
for those contained in the decree. 
It is reversible error to do so. 
II. 
The court abused its discretion in increasing alimony 
from $10.00 to $1,350.00 per month. 
The court in effect applied a legal reason for increasing 
alimony without considering the standard as iterated in Jones 
(Supra) and without finding any evidence of value or amount needed 
by the requesting spouse that was supported by the evidence or 
included in findings of fact. 
It was reversible error for the court not to include in 
its findings sufficient evidence that would enable a reviewing 
court to determine the underlying rationale for the finding. 
Ill. 
The court's findings were not supported by evidence. 
IV. 
The evidence presented at trial was deficient in that no 
amount was ever identified as the amount needed for the children's 
care. 
Plaintiff did not place into evidence a child support 
worksheet until after trial and then the necessary foundation was 
lacking. 
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Defendant argues that the submission of the child support 
schedule without the foundational evidence for the amounts used is 
reversible error. 
V. 
The plaintiff submitted no evidence supporting any amount 
claimed for alimony, child support or attorneys fees. The court 
should have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict and 
subsequent J.N.0.V. 
VI. 
The plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of attorneys 
fees at trial. 
The basis for the court's award was a document submitted 
10-days after trial which did not meet the standard enunciated in 
Talley (Supra). 
VII. 
The plaintiff committed perjury at trial by failing to 
disclose she had multiple bank accounts, that she has invested 
$4,500.00 in an airplane and $19,000.00 in her home, all the while 
claiming she was destitute. 
The foregoing also constitutes newly discovered evidence 
which was material to defendant's case and which he could not have 
discovered. 
The same argument applies to child support. 
Defendant should have been granted a new trial. 
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VIII. 
case 
The trial judge should have excused himself from this 
DATED this day of November, 1989. 
-5^/^/^f -^
 c
c/~/rX"S>->n 
GREG S. ERICKSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellani 
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THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DEANNA FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM N. FOXLEY, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D82-1591 
-oooOooo-
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the above-entitled 
Court, on Thursday, the 30th day of June, 1983, at the hour of 
10:00 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through her 
attorney, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant not appearing 
in person but through his attorney, Rulon R. Price, and the 
Court having heard the stipulations of counsel, having heard the 
sworn testimony of the plaintiff, having received proffers of 
proof from both counsel, having received documentary evidence, 
having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed the 
contents of the Court's file, and good cause appearing therefor, 
-1-
I 
m 
and having heretofore made and entered the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; 
NOW, THEREFORE; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore 
existing between the parties are dissolved, and a Decree of 
Divorce is granted to the plaintiff, to become final three months 
from the date of entry hereof. 
2. That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the four minor children, subject to reasonable rights 
of visitation in the defendant, and while the defendant is 
rcoiding outoide the State of Utah, -ho io awarded telephone 
visitation with the minor children and his mother is awarded 
liberal and fair visitation with the minor children. That both 
parties are ordered to attend counselling concerning their 
relationship with the minor children and for the benefit of the 
minor children. 
3. That the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff 
child support in the sum of $150.00 per month per child, $600.00 
in the aggregate, through the clerk of the Court, until the 
minor children reach the age of maiority. 
4 4 $ 
4. That the plaintiff io awarded an interest in 
defendant's medical degree, and is awarded the sum of $10.00 per 
month as alimony, and that at such time as tho defendant's 
i>ee*( A m*LT<*£(*Li Cka+ife. i** a team*/**«*<* 
income will Gupport paying a greater amount of alimony; tho / -rii*. f*# 7/ f0^ 
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srurs,
 a~f Ctt\/<1 S«//9£r AHJ/O /£ 
ff ohall bo entitled to oook a greater amount of alimony 
from the Court* 
5. That the plaintiff is awarded the home of the parties 
located at 735 Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with 
all equity therein, and the defendant is ordered to execute a 
Quit Claim Deed, conveying all of his interest in said property 
to the plaintiff. 
6. That the plaintiff is awarded the 1976 Toyota pick-up 
truck, and the defendant is awarded the 1973 MG Midget automobile 
and each party is ordered to execute vehicle titles or other 
documents to effect the transfer of said vehicles. 
7. That each party is awarded the personal property 
currently in his or her possession, except that the defendant is 
awarded the following property currently in the possession of 
the plaintiff: black camera case with contents, silver camera 
case with contents, tripod, enlarger, antique clock, red 
petrified stump, oak bench, any rifles in the possession of the 
plaintiff, his rocks, minerals and fossils owned prior to the 
marriage, one-half of rocks, minerals and fossils acquired during 
the marriage, all small antiques including waffle iron, insulators) 
and old irons, walnut coffee table, black rocking chair, medical 
books and other personal books, two boxes of antique books, and 
the coin collection including all paper money; the plaintiff is 
awarded the following personal property currently in the 
possession on the defendant: camping equipment consisting of 
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two sleeping bags, a Coleman stove, and a Coleman lantern; and 
the tools are awarded to the plaintiff for her use for three 
months and then are ordered divided between the parties, or 
the plaintiff shall give the defendant a $100.00 credit and 
retain possession of the tools. That the furniture belonging to j 
the plaintiff from prior to the marriage which is in storage is 
awarded to the plaintiff, and the defendant is ordered to make 
arrangements to convey possession of that property to the 
plaintiff. That the plaintifffs saving certificate consisting of Ij 
money received from the sale of her home prior to the marriage l 
is awarded to the plaintiff. 
8. That the plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the 
mortgage arrearages existing on the home of the parties and hold 
the defendant harmless therefrom, and the defendant is ordered l 
to assume and pay all of his student loans and the Visa account 
and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
9. That both parties are ordered to obtain and maintain 
health and accident insurance for the benefit of the minor 
children of the parties if such insurance is available through 
his or her employment. 
10. That the defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain 
life insurance on his life, if life insurance is available througli 
his employment as a group plan with either the minor children as 
beneficiaries or with a bank or similar financial institution 
as trustee for the benefit of the minor children. 
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11. That the defendant is ordered to pay the sum of 
$1,500-00 to the plaintiff for her reasonable attorney's fees* 
DATED this M ^ day of [A U % , 19#3. 
^ 
BY THE COURT: 
l 
Distriqt Judge 
Approved as to f gxjn: 0^4^, 
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HUEDllSTMCTCaUlT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 1 1989 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 824901591 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the Court based on the plaintiff's Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce to seek an increase in alimony and 
child support, and testimony having been taken and evidence 
admitted, argument to the Court having been made, and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises makes this its 
DECISION 
The Court finds that a substantial change of circumstance 
has occured in that the defendant's income has increased since the 
date of divorce from virtually nothing or approximately $50 per 
month to a figure which is not completely clear but which can be 
interpreted as being as high as $224,000 a year and certainly under 
no circumstances less than approximately $120,000 per year. The 
Court further finds that the plaintiff has done an admirable job of 
caring for herself and the children under very adverse 
circumstances and in educating and raising said children. She also 
has been struggling to obtain her own education to aid in the 
support of the children. The Court finds that the sum of $1,547 
per month is the correct amount for child support and the sum of 
$1,350 per month is fair and equitable as alimony. The Court 
further finds that the defendant should be required to provide 
health and dental insurance for the minor children of the parties 
and he is hereby ordered to do so. 
The Court does not find it necessary to invoke the recently 
declared novel theory of "equitable restitution" as enunciated by 
the Utah Court of Appeals nor is it necessary to invoke the 
provisions of the divorce decree wherein Judge Condor awarded an 
interest in the defendant's medical degree to the plaintiff. The 
Court finds that the change of circumstances above set forth are 
sufficient to justify the award herein without further findings 
regarding the questions relating to the defendant's medical 
degree. Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded to the 
plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's fee is as 
set forth in the affidavits provided by plaintiff's attorneys in 
the sum of $4,394 plus her costs incurred herein. Plaintiff's 
-2-
attorney will draft appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and amended decree to^mplement this decision. 
Dated this -2/ day of March, 1989. 
1 
District^ 
-3-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this $ t day of March, 1989: 
Robert W. Hughes 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Greg S. Ericksen 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
l^cylky ^re-V-gfO^ 
TabC 
ROBERT W. HUGHES (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)534-1074 
J U L - 6 1989 
S A L T LAKc iJOU i i V 
By. 
~/aZty ~^&immJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DEANNA 
vs. 
WILLIAM 
FOXLEY 
N. 
r / 
Plaintiff, ) 
FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
THIS MATTER came on for trial on September 22, 1988, at the 
hour of 2:00 p.m. and was subsequently continued to March 7f 1989 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify a 
Decree of Divorce before the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, Judge 
of the above-entitled Court, sitting without jury. The 
Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, was represented by Robert W. Hughes and 
the Defendant, William N. Foxley, was represented by Greg S. 
Ericksen. 
The Court having heard testimony and received evidence, 
argument to the Court having been made, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises is now prepared to enter its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married October 8, 
1 
1976. At the time of the marriage, the Plaintiff was an 
undergraduate student and the Defendant was a graduate student at 
Boise State University. 
2. The divorce trial was heard on June 30, 1983, a Decree 
of Divorce was signed on August 22, 1983 and entered on August 
23, 1983 to become final three months from the time of entry. 
3. At the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff was 
unemployed and had no income and the Defendant was a student and 
had an income, not including amounts received from student loans, 
of approximately $50.00 per month. 
4. That at the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff had 
expenses of $1,070.00 per month, the Defendant had expenses of 
$895.00 per month. 
5. The Defendant graduated from the University of Utah 
Medical School in June of 1983. 
6. During the parties marriage the parties had four minor 
children to wit: Christine, born September 19, 1970. (Christine 
was the daughter of the Plaintiff by a prior marriage who was 
adopted by the Defendant in October of 1980.); Sarah, born May 
23, 1977; Noall, born July 13, 1979; and Corinne, born April 15, 
1982 . 
7. During the marriage, the Plaintiff could not pursue her 
formal education due to frequent relocations of the Defendant in 
pursuing his medical career, because Plaintiff was employed at 
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various times during the marriage to assist in the support of the 
family, and due to the fact that Plaintiff was pregnant for a 
major portion of the time. 
The parties acquired few household furnishings, 
appliances or other personal property during the marriage. 
(J?/ For approximately the two years after the parties were 
divorced, the Plaintiff and the parties minor children required 
and received public assistance. 
f 9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has done an 
admirable job of caring for and educating the parties minor 
children. 
HO) The Court finds that the Plaintiff and the minor 
children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the 
divorce. 
11. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made significant 
personal sacrifices to further her education since the time of 
the divorce. After the divorce, Plaintiff obtained her bachelors 
degree in Sociology and expects to receive her masters degree in 
1989. Plaintiff anticipates pursuing a Ph.D. Length of time for 
:ompletion of this course of study will depend on course 
requirements 
y /^ ** 12. The Plaintiff intends to continue with her education in 
/ an effort to maximize her income potential. The testimony and 
evidence admitted at trial indicates that the prospects of the 
Plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time employment in her field 
will be difficult without additional education and that even with 
3 
additional education, employment opportunities are projected to 
be limited in the future. 
13. During the year 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a part-
time employee and had a gross income of $9,600.00. 
14. In 1987, the Defendant moved to Winslow, Arizona where 
he is the only medical doctor who specializes in obstetrics and 
gynecology in that vicinity. 
15. During the year 1987, the last year which the Defendant 
was able to provide a tax return, the Defendant had a gross 
income of $128,437.00. The Defendant's 1987 income was comprised 
of wages he received $16,031.00 as an employee, for approximately 
6 months, at the Huerly Medical Center in Michigan, and from the 
private practice of medicine. The Defendant earned $112,406.00 
from his private medical practice in approximately 6 months of 
practice. 
16. The earnings of the Defendant as well ^s his -fuXur-e 
potential have been considered by the court for the purpose of 
determining whether the amcumt of alimony should be modified. 
17. The Defendant's present income is not completely clear 
but the Court finds based upon the evidence that his gross income 
can be interpreted as being as high as $224,000.00 a year but 
certainly under no circumstances less than approximately 
$120,000.00 per year. 
18. The Defendant was able to contribute $41,660.00 to a 
Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987 and he anticipated contributing a 
similar amount to a retirement plan in 1988. 
4 
19. The Court finds that there has been a substantial 
change of circumstances in the parties income since the time of 
the divorce. 
20. Based upon the changes of circumstances, a modification 
of the decree of divorce is warranted. The Court does not, 
however, find it necessary to invoke the theory of "Equitable 
Restitution" as annunciated by the Utah Courts of Appeals nor is 
it necessary to the Court to invoke the provisions of the 
original divorce decree, wherein Judge Condor awarded an interest 
in the Defendant's medical degree to the Plaintiff, since the 
change of circumstances and the needs of the Plaintiff and the 
minor children are sufficient to justify a modification of the 
decree. 
21. Based upon the change of circumstances and the needs of 
the children, child support to be paid by the Defendant should be 
increased to the appropriate amount reflected in the judicial 
district's support guidelines. 
22. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has an adjusted 
gross part-time income of $800.00 per month and that the 
Defendant has an adjusted gross income, after the subtractions of 
his minimum necessary expenses, in excess of $6,985.00 per month. 
23. The proportionate share of the parties combined income 
is 10* and 90* for the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively. 
24. The Court finds that based upon the Plaintiff fs and 
Defendant's combined adjusted gross incomes, the amount of child 
support per child should be the sum of $607.00 per month for the 
5 
minor children Sarah and Noall and should be the amount of 
$504.00 for the parties youngest child, Corinne, for a total 
child support amount of $1,718.00, monthly, for all three minor 
children. The Defendant, pursuant to the support guidelines, 
should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,549.00 for child 
support. The Court further finds that the amount of child 
support for Corinne should increase to the sum of $607.00 per 
month beginning on April 15, 1989, since she will be 7 years of 
age on that date. Therefore, beginning on April 15, 1989, the 
Defendants child support obligation will increase to $1,638.00 
per month, $546.00 per month per minor child. 
25. The Court further finds that pursuant to the support 
guidelines, the child support to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff should be decreased by 25* during those periods which 
the Defendant has extended visitation of 25 consecutive or more 
days with the minor child(ren). 
26. The Court finds that at the time of the hearing the 
Plaintiff was in arrears in property taxes for her residence in 
excess of $3,000.00 and that they Plaint iff' s residence was in 
jeopardy of being sold by the county for back property taxes; 
that the Plaintiff is nine payments behind on her mortgage 
payments, that the Plj*vnMff has incurred substantial debts for 
medical^ _dental_ .and orthodontic expenses for the children; that 
the home where the Plaintiff and the minor children reside is in 
poor condition and is in need of substantial and major repairs, 
including repairs to the roof, foundation,/ interior and exterior 
6 
walls and plumbing, rebuilding of the back entry into the home, 
as well as other repairs; and, that the Plaintiff and the 
children are in need of new appliances and household furnishings, 
including beds, furniture, a washer and dryer, a stove and also. 
new clothing and shoes. _.- -- — ~ ~~ ~ ~ " 
The Plaintiff is currently living in the same home as 
when the Decree was entered. 
27. The Court finds that at the time of the modification 
hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of 
the parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need 
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial 
and significant personal hardships since the time of the divorce. 
28. The Court finds that it is just and equitable that the 
monthly alimony, to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
should be increased from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00 per 
month. Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989. 
29. The Court further finds that the Defendant should be 
required to provide health and dental insurance for the minor 
children of the parties. The Court further finds that it is 
equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including 
orthodontic expenses, not paid by health and dental insurance 
should be divided equally between the parties. 
30. The Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded 
to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney!s 
fees would be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs incurred 
herein. 
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31. The Court finds that that the Plaintiff's Counsel's 
fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering 
the length of time expended and the complexities of the issues, 
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable. 
32. That tha Court did not consider whether alimony should 
ba tarainatad but would entertain further hearing upon 
application of althar party or future petitions for modification. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been a substantial change of circumstances 
aince the Decree of Divorce was originally entered in this 
matter. 
2. It is fair and reasonable, based upon the change of 
circumstances, that the amount of child support to be paid by the 
Defendant should be increased in accordance with the schedules 
set forth in the child support guidelines. 
3. The child support to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff for support of the parties minor children should 
increase to the amount of $1,549.00 per month for the three minor 
children. The amount of child support to be paid by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff for the support of the parties minor 
children should be increased to the amount of $1,638.00 per 
month, $546.00 per child per month, beginning April 15, 1989. 
4. The Plaintiff has endured and continues to endure 
significant and substantial hardships and has made significant 
and substantial sacrifices since the time of the divorce and she 
8 
has a significant and substantial need at present and in the 
future for an increase in alimony. 
5. It is fair and reasonable that the amount of alimony 
payable from the Defendant to the Plaintiff be increased to 
$1,350.00 per month, commencing April 19, 1989. 
6. The Defendant should provide health, accident and 
dental insurance for the parties minor children and any medical 
and dental costs, including orthodontic treatments, which are not 
paid by medical insurance shall be divided equally between the 
parties. 
7. It is just and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded 
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,394.00 plus costs incurred 
herein. 
DATED this 
0FFAT 
URT JUDGE 
Robert 
Atto>r\ney 
W. H U A M ^ "^ 
y foy>Pla in t i : 
'GregHB. //fericJcsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
MISC:Foxley 
9 
Robert W. Hughes (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 \ 
Telephone: (801) 534-1074 '% y 
X\J:.' f"..;i8iC7 scant 
Tli;ru JjJiCc.i 0'i.tncf 
APR 1 ' 1989 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM M. FOXLF.Y , 
Defendant. 
MODIFICATION OF DECREE 
OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No: D82-1591 
Judae Richard H. Moffat 
&\v> H 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the Court, based upon the plaintiffs petition to 
modify the decree of divorce. The plaintiff was present at the 
hearing and represented by counsel, Robert W. Hughes. The 
defendant was also present at the hearing and represented by 
counsel, Greg S. Ericksen. 
The Court having received testimony and admitted 
evidence, argument to the court having been made and the Court 
being fully advised on the premises and based upon the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered herein, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The Decree of Divorce should be modified as 
follows. Paragraph 3 of the orginal Decree of Divorce states: 
"3. That the defendant is Ordered to pay the plaintiff 
child support in the sum of $150.00 per month, per 
child, $600.00 in the aggregrate through the Clerk of 
the Court, until the minor children reach the age of 
majority. fl 
This paragraph of the orginal Decree of Divorce is hereby 
as follows: 
"3. That the defendant is hereby Ordered to pay the 
plaintiff child support in the sum of $1,547*00 per month. The 
amount of child support payable from the defendant to the 
plaintiff shall be increased to the sum of $1,638.00 per month, 
which represents $546.00 per month per minor child, beginning 
April 15, 1989. 
(2) Paragraph 4 of the original Decree of Divorce 
states : 
"4. That the plaintiff has an interest in the 
defendants medical degree, and is awarded the sum of 
$10.00 per month as alimony, and that at such time as 
there has been a material change in circumstance of the 
parties, the issue of child support and/or alimony may 
be reviewed. !l 
This paragraph of the original decree of divorce is hereby 
modified as follows: 
"4. That the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the 
sum of $1,350.00 per month as and for alimony until further Order 
of this Court. 
(3) Paragraph 9 of the original Decree of Divorce 
states: 
"9. That both parties are Order to obtain and maintain 
health and accident insurance for the benefit of the 
minor children of the parties if such insurance is 
available through his or her employment." 
This paragraph of the orginal decree of divorce is hereby 
modified as follows: 
9. That the defendant shall provide health and dental 
insurance for the minor children of the parties and is hereby 
specifically Ordered to do so. Any medical or dental expenses, 
including orthodonic expenses not paid by health insurance shall 
be divided equally between the parties. 
-2-
(4) The Decree of Divorce shall also be modified to 
include the following: 
During any given period in which the defendant shall 
have extended visitation with the minor child(ren) of 25 
consecutive days or more, the amount of child support the 
defendant is required to pay to the plaintiff shall decrease by 
25% during the period of extended visitation. 
(5) The plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of 
$4,394.00 against the defendant as and for attorneys1 fees and 
costs which the plaintiff has incurred in^ fchis matter. 
Dated this / / d a y ot ^ffypyjc^ , 1989. 
B^JME COW^T: 
-3-
1-FOX-J1 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this / day of April, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE AND 
JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to Greg S. Ericksen, 1065 South 500 
West, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
Robert W. Hughes 
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IN THU DISTRICT COURT OF _HZ THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT III AND 
FOR SALT LAK2 COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
DiiAHN** FOXLLY, 
vs. 
WILLIAIi FOXLi-Y, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. D 82 1591 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
* * * 
This cause came on to be heard before the 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, one of the Judges of the said 
Court, on the 7th day of March, 1989, when and where the 
following proceedings were had. 
* * * 
A P P L A R A l i C E S 
For the Plaintiff; 
For the Defendant; 
MR. ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Attorney at Law 
50 West Third South, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I-3R. GRLG S. ERICKSaM 
Attorney at Law 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Utah 34010 
HAL H. WALTON 
Registered Professional Reporter 
ill",. LIiICl^ -I-1: Your case is closed. 
IIP*. HUGHES: YOu and I agreed v;e would put on my 
attorney's f^cs, in charters this morning. That would be 
the last thing we did. I said I would do it by proffer. 
hR. R^IC::£~1I: I said I have no objections if you 
did it during your case, 
:u\. IIUGIIL-G. Move to proffer my attorney's fees, 
your Honor. 
TH~ COURT; You raay .go ahead. 
•IK. IIUGIUG: Your Honor, let ne have these marked, 
if I could, please. Two documents I would submit to the 
Court. Exhibits Ko. 16 and 17. Exhibit Ko. 16 v/ould be 
the monthly statements that I sent to the plaintiff for 
services rendered and would show an amount due presently, 
including payments which she has made, of $3,180. exhibit 
No. 17 was an affidavit that I prepared and filed with the 
Court for our first hearing, one of cur first hearings on 
this matter, indicating my attorney's fees for $1,S65 up 
until February. The Court, if it reviews this, will notice 
that from about 1937 up until February, it showed that 
Deanna Foxley had a credit and that there were no services 
provided during that time. The problem was that we had 
changed billings at that time and those were not repre-
sented on the new computer bills that we entered into. For 
ease of the Court, I v/ould waive my initial attorney's fees 
114 
3 
4 
1
 in this natter, the $1,900, and sub:lit .My attorney's fee 
2 I would be as indicated in Plaintiff's Lxhibit Ho. 16 and total 
$3,000. I would have to include the payments as indicated 
made to me by the plaintiff. 
* I would move for the adialssion of Plaintiff's 
6
 exhibit 2-k>s. 16 and 17. 
7
 VIIL COUKT: Over objection? 
* 1!?.. jJ]<ICKL>bM: Over objection. 
* THL COURT: Will be received. 
10 You gentlemen want summary? 
11 Ilcl. H-'.IC\JUN: Likt* a closing, yes. 
12 TII^  COURT: We'll take a ten-minute break so Hal 
13 can rest his fingers. We'll come back and listen to 
14 closing. 
15 I (Whereupon, the recess was taken.) 
THL C0US2: You nay proceed. 
I-iI\. UP.ICKoi;IT; First address child supportf your 
** I Honor. The Uniform Child Support guidelines overview 
1' I requires that worksheets must be completed in accordance 
*0 ' with instructions contained therein and submitted to the 
21 I Court with supporting financial certification. The problem 
that I have got with Ilr. Hughes1 offer of his schedule is 
*' number one, tht.it* was no foundation for it, and number two, 
** no ability to cross-examine by the defendant, number three, 
** it was submitted after he closed his case, and number four, 
16 
17 
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GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002 
Attorney for Defendant 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Ut 84010 
Telephone:(801)295-6841 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA 
VS. 
WILLIAM 
FOXLEY, ) 
M. 
Plaintiff, ) 
FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY'S PEES 
OF ROBERT W. HUGHES 
CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
COMES NOW Greg S. Ericksen, counsel for Defendant who 
objects to Supplement to Attorney's fees of Robert W. Hughes 
based on the following: 
Counsel for Plaintiff Robert W. Hughes did not submit his 
attorney's fees during trial of this matter, and submits evidence 
of attorney's fees after the case has been^ Kejard and/a^j^ed^ 
DATED this A\ day of March, 1989, 
/GRHt3 S. ERICAS 
^Counsel for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of March, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection was mailed via 
first class mail, postage pre-paid thereon to Robert W. Hughes at 
the following address: 1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101. 
4ARY HAlLMAN 
MISCrFoxley 
TabF 
Robert W. Hughes (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1074 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, i 
VS. ! 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, ! 
Defendant. : 
; SUPPLEMENT TO ATTORNEYS 
: FEES OF ROBERT W. HUGHES 
: Civil No: D82-1591 
: Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Attached hereto is a copy of the attorneys' fees 
incurred by Robert W. Hughes through the date of trial* This 
submission is to supplement the exhibit of attorneys' fees 
submitted at trial. 
DATED this | (p day of March, 1989. 
W1-FOX-SA1 
Robert W. Hughes 
Attorney at Law 
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
(801) 534-1074 
DeAnna Foxley 
735 Wall Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
BILLING DATE 03-13-89 
HD-RWH-32 
ACC'T NO. RWH87DM-816-1 
DEVIOUS BALANCE 
iTE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
-28-89 Conference with client(s). 
-02-89 Preparation for hearing, 
-02-89 Preparation of Response to Motion. 
-05-89 Preparation of Response to Motion. 
-05-89 Preparation for hearing. 
-06-89 Conference with client(s). 
-06-89 Preparation for hearing. 
-06-89 Telephone conf. with opposing attorney, 
-07-89 Preparation for hearing. 
-07-89 Court appearance for hearing. 
-07-89 Conference with client(s). 
>TAL FOR THE ABOVE SERVICES 
INDIV 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
RWH 
TIME 
1.10 
1.00 
0.60 
2.60 
2.80 
1.20 
4.80 
0.20 
1.20 
5.40 
0.80 
21.70 
$3,180.00 
$66.00 
$60.00 
$36.00 
$156.00 
$168.00 
$72.00 
$288.00 
$12.00 
$72.00 
$324.00 
$48.00 
$1,302.00 
kTE EXPENSES 
-07-89 Transcript Cost. 
'TAL FOR THE ABOVE EXPENSES 
PAYMENT RECEIVED 
Q2—27—89 
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
$62.25 
TOTAL 
$150.00 
AMOUNT DUE 
$62.25 
$4,544.25 
$150.00 
$4,394.25 
Prompt payment is appreciated. 
Make check payable to Robert W. Hughes. 
*** THANK YOU *** 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this \(f7 day of March, 
1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENT TO 
ATTORNEYS FEES OF ROBERT W. HUGHES was mailed, first-class 
postage thereon prepaid, to Greg S. Ericksen, 1065 South 300 
East, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
Roft^ rt MJ fttltjhes 
TabG 
GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002 
Attorney for Defendant 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Ut 84010 
Telephone:(801)295-6841 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, ) AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT FARE 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
vs. ) 
) JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
COMES NOW Robert Farr, who being duly placed under oat1 
deposes and says as follows: 
1. That on about March, 1985, I became acquainted with one 
Deanna Foxley. 
2. During the course of 3 years from March, 1985 to about 
July, 1988, I saw her socially. 
3. That during the period that I knew her, she informed me 
that she was involved in a court action with her ex-husband, Bill 
Foxley. 
4 That during the co\irse of our involvement she confided 
the following information to me. 
A. That she had to appear as if she was destitute in 
order to get a big settlement from her ex-husband. 
1 
B. She to]d me that she had turned down job offers 
that would have paid her $40,000.00 per year until after the 
court case with Bill Foxley was completed. 
C. She told me that she borrowed money for her 
education to make it appear that she was rehabilitating herself. 
D. She told me that she kept her work hours to a 
minimum so it would appear that she earned very little. 
E. She told me that she would not disclose the fact 
that she had other income from other jobs to Bill's attorney. 
F. She told me that her attorney advised her to open 
a secret bank account that would not disclose all of her money 
that she had or earned. 
She told me that she would not tell Bill's 
attorney about the bank account but that it would be kept secret. 
The bank account was kept at Utah Bank & Trust 
und^r the name of Deanna Foxley and her daughter Kristine Foxley. 
G. That she obtained copies of cases from her 
attorney so she could read them. 
5. That in April, 1989 T contacted Greg S. Ericksen with 
this information. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
k 
OBERT S. FARR 
\ 
2 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
SS 
The undersigned being a Notary Public does hereby certify 
that on this day of May, 1989, personally appeared before 
me, Robert Farr, who executed the forerjoing Affidavit. 
K. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of May, 1989 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit was mailed via first-
class roai.1. postage pre-paid thereon to Robert W. Hughes at 
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
MARY PETERSEN 
MISC:Foxley-F.aff 
3 
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GREG S. ERICKSEN - 1002 
Attorney for Defendant 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Ut 84010 
Telephone:(801)295-6841 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) MAUREEN HEGSTED 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
vs. ) 
) JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW, Maureen Hegsted, who states that on or about 
March 20, 1989, Deanna Foxley did give me the attached letter and 
statement that she did represent to be the cash expenditures that 
she has made on the home located at 735 Wall Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 1989. 
\ ^ 
MAUREEN HEGSTED 
1 
The undersigned being a Notary Public does hereby certify 
that on this 1st day of June, 1989, personally appeared before 
me, Maureen Hegsted, who executed the foregoing Affidavit. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at:_ 
My commission expires: 
2 
"MAJOR" IMPROVEMENTS MADE ON PROPERTY AT 735 WALL STREET, SALT IAKE 
CITY, UTAH BY DEANNA 0. POXLEY: 
ITEM APPRQX. POST 
1. Insulation: $ 1,500.00 
a. Ceiling 
b. basement 
c. breakfast rocm 
2. Remodeling: 11,500.00 
a. Kitchen (cabinets, sink) 
b. Flooring (kitchen, breakfast rocm, bath, 
wash rocm) 
c. Carpeting (7 rocms) 
d. Upstairs bath (cabinets, toilet, shcwer) 
e. Interior spiral stairway 
f. Added new small rocm dcwnstairs 
g. Remodeled upper floor plan 
h. Complete new front porch flooring and railing 
3. Permanent fixtures: 1,250.00 
a. Levelor blinds 
b. Ceiling fan/light fixture 
c. Dishwasher 
d. Hot water heater 
4. Energy-efficient heating unit 850.00 
5. Storm Doors & Windows 550.00 
6. Miscellaneous: 1,750.00 
a. Rain gutters 
b. Exterior paint (1988) 
c. Subbed in wash rocm 
d. Yard trees, shrubs, flcwers, sod 
e. Yard-fill to improve front yard 
7. General electrical and plumbing work: 1,500.00 
8. Fencing: 700.00 
TOTAL $19,600.00 
March 20, 1989 
Maurine: 
Please find enclosed the tax statement that you requested along vdth 
a Quit-Claim Deed from Bill and a Quit-Claim Deed fran myself. I 
have also included the list of "major" inprovonents viiich you asked 
for. I hope these will be helpful. 
I will wait to hear from you after your return from Louisiana. 
Sincerely yours, 
UPAs 
Tab I 
GREG S. EPICKSEN - 1002 
Attorney for Defendant 
1065 South 500 West 
Bountiful, 171 84010 
Telephone: {80!}295-6a«i7 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
DEANNA FOXLEY, ) 
) MOTION TO FIND PLAINTIFF IN 
Plaintiff, ) CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR PERJURY 
) CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
vs. ) 
) JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, Defendant above-named through counsel,, who moves 
the Court to find Plaintiff, Peanna Foxley. in contempt of court 
for perjury in sworn statements and testimony giT-'en before this 
court. 
Said motion is based on the pleadings submitted in this case 
which show on their face that Plaintiff has lied to the court and 
committed perjury. 
1. Plaintiff, in an affidavit dated May 16, 1989, made the 
following sworn statements that are in direct contradiction to 
her previous sworn statements and testimony at trial. 
A. Mrs. Foxley states on May 16, 1989, that she gave one 
Robert Farr money during 1986 and 1987 for a one-half (1/2) 
interest in an airplane and that Mr. Farr owed her money. She 
indicates that she was to receive money for rental of an airplane 
and that she considered the money a loan. 
1 
On January 21, 1987, Plaintiff was asked to list all persons 
who owed her money. She deliberately ommitted Robert Farr (see 
Exhibit A attached). 
On January 21, 1987, Plaintiff was asked if she had any 
business enterprises. She answered no despite the fact that she 
now states she bought a plane to lease for business purposes. 
The thrust of Plaintiff, Deanna Foxiey's testimony in 
pleadings and at trial was that she was so destitute that she 
could not pay property taxes for 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 
and 1988. 
Yet through an undisclosed checking acount, she was spending 
what she alleges is close to $4,500.00 to purchase an airplane. 
Defendants investigation into other allegations of perjury 
is continuing. 
B. Mrs. Foxley states on May 16, 1989, that she had two 
checking accounts. One account,was opened in 1983, the other was 
opened in 1985. She states in her affidavit that both accounts 
were used for the same purpose, "during the time both accounts 
were open, I used them for the same purposes, i.e. payment of my 
monthly expenses." She testifies that she had both checking 
accounts until March 1988. 
On January 21, 1987, Plaintiff stated under oath that she 
had one checking account and one savings account when, in fact, 
she had two checking accounts (see Exhibit B attached). 
On March 24, 1988, Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, appeared at a 
deposition and there pursuant to a Request for Production, 
2 
produced all checks that she had written for a six (6) month 
period (July 1987 through February 1988). She produced checks 
frcm what she represented as her only account (0577 account). 
The deposition and pre-trial discovery is replete with her 
representations that- she only had one bank account (0577 
account). 
At trial when Defendant through counsel put in an exhibit of 
her checks covering a period of P£Y (6) months, from July 1987 
through January 1988 (0577 account)., produced at deposition, 
Plaintiff Deanra Foxley was asked and answered as follows: 
MR. ERICKSEN- Do yon have any othe^ checking accounts the4 
you would have run money through9 
A. No , J do not. 
The trial transcript is al^o r^ ni^ t-R with references that 
she only had one checking account 
After trial Robert Farr disclosed that Plaintiff; Deanna 
Foxley, had another checking account. He states she kept this 
account secret from Defendant, Bill Foxley. Attached is check 
1414 attached to her most recent affidavit of a check written 
during the discovery period but not disclosed. 
In 20(h) of her recent affidavit, Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley 
makes the assertion that she has attached statements from the 
initial account (the 3998 account) as proof that she had no 
secret assets. 
The fact is that the (3998) was never disclosed. Further, 
the request for production was for July 1987 through February 
3 
1988 not for the year 1986 as Plaintiff has attached. In 
response to the request for production, Plaintiff produced copies 
of checks and statements from July 1987 through February 1988 
from the (0577 account) see example attached. 
There is absolutely no question tha^ Plaintiff; Deanna 
Foxley, lied both in pre-trial discovery and at trial. Her May 
16, 1989 affidavit confirms that. 
The information and verification of how much income she had 
and her expenses as contained in her financial records was 
absolutely essential to Defendant's oas^ Had Defendant known of 
the other account, it would have been subpoened. 
It is clear on its face that Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley lied 
and should be held in contempt of court for perjury. 
DATED this Jw day of May, 1989. 
!SEN 
/Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of May, 1989 a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion To Find Plaintiff In 
Contempt of Court was hand delivered to Robert W. Hughes at: 
1000 Valley Tower, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
MARY PETERSEN ^ 
MISC:Foxley 
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therein you may have held by any person/ firm or business 
entity in your behalf. 
ANSWER: None. 
50. Please list the names and addresses of each person 
or business entity that owes you money. 
ANSWER: William N. Foxley, 9448 Parkwood Avenue, 
Davison, Michigan 48423. 
51. Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, have you 
engaged in any business enterprise, either solely or jointly 
with other individuals or businesses? If so, please state 
the names and addresses of each person or business entity and 
the beginning date and ending date of any business 
enterprise. 
ANSWER: No. 
52. Please state any and all funds which you received 
from any other source, personf entity, gift or donation which 
are used for the payment of your monthly expenses by listing 
for each said fund the name and address of the person making 
said contribution, the gross and net amount of each 
contribution per month, the total amount of contributions 
paid during the years of 1984 and 1985 and the basis and 
purpose for each said contribution. 
ANSWER: Child support from William N. Foxley, $600.00 
per month, Court ordered; alimony from William N. Foxley, 
the Defendant has sold any of the securities so listed, 
please describe the type and number of securities sold, the 
name of the issuing entity, the date of sale, the sale price 
and the net gain or loss which resulted from the sale. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
45. Subsequent to the entry of the prior Order of the 
Court herein, have you obtained any savings or commercial 
accounts in your name solely or jointly with others in any 
bank or financial institution? If so, for each and every 
account, please state the name and address of the bank or 
financial institution, the type of the account, the names on 
the account, the names on the persons authorized to draw on 
the account, the account number, and the present balance, if 
any, or the amount of the last before the account was closed. 
ANSWER: Yes. Bank of Utah, 175 South West Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, checking account #0359, in Deanna and 
Kristine Foxley's name, $200.00; and Bank of Utah, savings 
account #7048, in Deanna Foxley's name, $1,100.00. 
46. Subsequent to the date of the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce herein, have there been any bank accounts in which 
your name did not appear but to which you deposited money or 
withdrew money by check or other method? If so, for each 
account please state the name and address of the bank or 
financial institution, the name under which the account 
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Robert W. Hughes (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1074 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM M. FOXLEY, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Civil No: D82-1591 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Robert W. Hughes, attorney for Plaintiff, certify the 
following documents: 
Motion to Disqualify attorney; 
Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Post Trial 
Motions and Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions; 
And, Plaintiff's Affidavit* 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Greg S. Erickson, Esquire, 1065 
South 500 West, Bountiful, Utah, 84010. 
DATED this Ufl^day of May, 1989, 
lughes 
Tab J 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-4600 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
OOoOooo 
DEANNA S. FOXLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ROBERT S. FARR, 
Defendant. 
SUMMONS 
Civil No-
Judge 
-oooOooo-
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in 
writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above-
entitled Courtf and to serve upon or mail to Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., 
attorney for plaintiff, at 310 South Main Street, Suite 1309, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, a copy of said answer, within twenty (20) days 
after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has been 
filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is hereby 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this ZS day of \c^~i , 1989, 
Defendant's address: 
1885 East 7700 S. 
South Weber City, UT 84405 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. 
Attorney for Plaint 
310 South Main Stre 
Salt Lake City, Uta 
KW139.22 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-4600 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
oooOooo 
DEANNA S. FOXLEY, : 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
Civil No. 
ROBERT S. FARR, : 
Judge 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the plaintiff in the above-entitled action, by and 
through her attorney Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and for cause of action 
against the defendant, alleges as follows: 
1. That plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and, at the time of the transactions hereinafter referred 
to, defendant was a resident of Salt Lake County, in the State of 
Utah. 
2. That defendant is the registered owner of a Piper 
aircraft, model PA 28 151 Warrior, FAA Registration No. N40953, 
including a King 4096 Transponder and King two-way radio. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
3. That the parties entered into an agreement whereby the 
plaintiff purchased a one-half interest in said Piper aircraft for 
the sum of $4,572.55. 
4. That the parties cannot now agree on the use or 
disposition of the Piper aircraft, but the defendant refuses to sell 
the same or to reimburse the plaintiff for her interest therein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
5. That, in the alternative, the plaintiff loaned to 
defendant the sum of $4,572*55 to be utilized in purchasing and 
maintaining the Piper aircraft. 
6. That the defendant has failed and refused to reimburse 
the plaintiff for the loan proceeds. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against defendant as 
follows: 
1. On her first cause of action, for judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $4,572.55. 
2. On her first cause of action, for interest on said sum 
from the time paid to defendant until the time of judgment. 
3. For costs of this action. 
4. On her second cause of action, for judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $4,572.55. 
5. For interest on said sum from the time received by 
defendant until the date of judgment. 
6. For the costs of this action. 
DATED this 2S day of -3IA^U<I^ , 1989. 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. 
IkoWcS 1 -l,^,^ 
Thomas N. Arnett, 
Plaintiff's address: Attorney for Plairft 
735 Wall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 KW139.19 
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